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CALIFORNIA CORPORATIONS CODE SECTION
25530(b): GOVERNMENT AGENCY SUIT
VERSUS THE PRIVATE CLASS ACTION
In 1968 the California Legislature replaced the Corporate Securi-
ties Law,' which had been in effect for more than fifty years, with a
new law2 representing a significant departure from its predecessor.
The drafters of the 1968 act drew heavily upon the experience of the
federal government in the area of securities regulation, as well as upon
the state's experience with the repealed securities act.3  The result is
a forward-looking body of law that may well become a model for other
states. Yet many of the new law's provisions are innovations, and thus
untried in the day-to-day world in which laws must operate. Only the
test of time will determine its ultimate success.
The enforcement procedures of the new law are a combination
of remedies from the old law and new, innovative remedies. This
union of old and new remedies is designed to deal with modem prob-
lems of investor protection and, as with the rest of the law, will require
testing and adjustment to gain the maximum protection for the invest-
ing public. The law's first level of investor protection and the enforce-
ment procedures accompanying it are the statutes governing qualifica-
tion of securities with the commissioner of corporations.4 The second
level of investor protection in the new law is the statutes concerned
with prohibiting violations of the law which are generally outside the
1. Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 532, § 1-29, at 673 (repealed 1969). The act of 1917
had not been substantially altered in its 52 year history. See 1 H. MARSH & RL VOLK,
PRACrICE UNDER Tn CALnIORNIA SECUmTS LAws § 1.01, at 1-3 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as MARSH & VOLK].
2. CAL. CORP. CODE H9 25000-804 (West Supp. 1974), formerly enacted as Cal.
Stat. 1968, ch. 88, § 2, at 243 (effective Jan. 2, 1969).
3. See MARSH & VoLex, supra note 1, § 1.05[2], at 1-43. For a detailed history
of the California Securities Law, see id. H§ 1.01-.06, at 1-3 to -55.
4. See CAL. CORP. CODE H9 25100-66 (West Supp. 1974). If the commissioner
of corporations finds that a particular offer or sale of a security does not meet the stat-
utory standards of qualification (see id. H§ 25111-13, 25121, 25131), the commissioner
may enforce the qualification requirement by: (1) issuing a stop order or suspending
or revoking the permit (id. § 25140(a)); (2) refusing to issue a permit (id. § 25140(b)-
(c)); (3) refusing to consent to the transfer of securities (id. § 25151); (4) imposing
conditions which must be met before the securities can be offered or sold (id. §§ 25141,
25147-48); or (5) issuing a desist and refrain order (id. § 25532).
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scope of the qualification procedure. 5 At this level, remedies have not
only been provided the commissioner of corporations,' a private civil
cause of action has been created as well 7 for certain well-defined viola-
tive activities. 8  The focus of this note is upon the conflict which can
arise between section 25530(b) of the Corporations Code, which au-
thorizes the commissioner of corporations to seek restitution or damages
for private individuals injured by activity proscribed by the civil liability
provisions, 9 and the private right of individual investors to sue to obtain
restitution or damages for the same proscribed conduct under sections
25500 through 25504 of that code.
Section 25530(b) provides:
The commissioner may, with the approval of the Attorney
General, include in any action authorized by subdivision (a) of this
section a claim for restitution or damages under [the civil liability
provisions of sections 25500 to 25004 of the Corporations Code]
on behalf of the persons injured by the act or practice constituting
the subject matter of the action, and the court shall have jurisdic-
tion to award appropriate relief to such persons, if the court finds
that enforcement of the rights of such persons by private civil ac-
tion, whether by class action or otherwise, would be so burdensome
or expensive as to be impractical. 10
Under sections 25500 through 25504, individuals may bring pri-
vate actions if they have been injured by any of the following illegal
5. See id. §§ 25500-50.
6. If the commissioner finds that a person or persons have engaged or are about
to engage in any act or practice in violation of the new law or any rule or order pursuant
to it, he may: (1) bring an action seeking an injunction, the appointment of a receiver
for defendants' assets, and, in certain situations, restitution or damages for persons in-
jured by the violative activity (id. § 25530); (2) institute an investigation of the act
or practice (id. § 25531(a)(1)); (3) publish information concerning the act or practice
(id. § 25531 (a) (2) ); or (4) refer the information to the district attorney in the county
in which the violation occurred for possible criminal prosecution (id. § 25533).
7. Id. H9 25500-04.
8. Id. H§ 25110, 25130, 25133, 25141, 25219, 25400-02.
9. California Corporation Code sections 25500 to 25504 establish civil liability.
Sections 25400 to 25402 describe the proscribed activity pursuant to which civil liability
has been created under sections 25500 to 25502. Civil liability attaches under section
25503 for violation of specified qualification procedures. Section 25504 establishes lia-
bility for "control persons."
10. Id. § 25530. Subdivision (a) of section 25530 reads as follows: "Whenever
it appears to the commissioner that any person has engaged or is about to engage in
any act or practice constituting a -violation of any provision of this law or any rule or
order hereunder, he may in his discretion bring an action in the name of the people
of the State of California in the superior court to enjoin the acts or practices or to en-
force compliance with this law or any rule or order hereunder. Upon a proper showing
a permanent or preliminary injunction, restraining order, or writ of mandate shall be
granted and a receiver or conservator may be appointed for the defendant or the defend-
ant's assets. The court may not require the commissioner to post a bond."
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activities:" (1) creation of a false or misleading appearance of active
trading or a false or misleading appearance with respect to the market
for any security;' 2 (2) creation of a series of transactions which gives
the appearance of trading actively or raising or depressing the price for
inducement of purchase or sale;' 3 (3) circulation of information on in-
duced market fluctuations; 4 (4) use of false or misleading statements
to induce purchase or sale;15 (5) receipt of consideration for circulation
of information on induced market fluctations;16 (6) offers to buy or
sell based on a material, untrue statement or omission;1 7 and (7) sale
or purchase by person(s) having access, through a special relationship
with the issuer, to material information not available to the public.' 8
Since both the commissioner of corporations and private individ-"
uals may seek restitution or damages for injuries resulting from conduct
proscribed in sections 25500 through 25504, public and private actions
may both be brought regarding the same alleged violations. In such
a case, a court would be compelled to decide which action should be
allowed to proceed or whether the two separate actions should be con-
solidated. This note will attempt to establish some guidelines relevant
to such a decision. Accordingly, it will first be necessary to explore
the reasoning of the drafters of the 1968 California Corporate Securi-
ties Law in adopting the governmental remedy when the private action
had been the exclusive means of establishing liability under the re-
pealed securities law and could have been given this same role under
the new law.' 9 Second, the note will examine the nature of the section
25530(b) public action to ascertain the appropriate procedures to be
used by the commissioner of corporations and attorney general in
11. Id. Section 25510 was designed to ensure that civil lialility under the new
law was not expanded beyond the enumerated proscribed acts of the civil liability pro-
visions. "Except as explicitly provided . . .no civil liability in favor of any private
party shall arise against any person by implication from or as a result of the violation
of any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder." Id.
12. Id. § 25400(a).
13. Id. § 25400(b).
14. Id. § 25400(c).
15. Id. § 25400(d).
16. Id. § 25400(e).
17. Id. § 25401.
18. Id. § 25402.
19. See text accompanying notes 25-41 infra. As an adjunct to this discussion,
it will be shown that public and private actions may compete to afford relief to private
individuals, not only in the area of securities regulation, but also in other areas of the
law where public agencies are given enforcement powers by state statutes. See text ac-
companying notes 49-52 infra.
20. The claim for restitution or damages requires the concurrence of the attorney
general and commissioner of corporations. CAL. Colp. CODE § 25530(b) (West Supp.
1974). The purpose of requiring attorney general approval is to ensure that "the cir-
cumstances under which such actions may be maintained are restricted to those in which
instituting such an action,2 a determination which the courts have not
yet made. It will be shown that the section 25530(b) public action
is similar to, but distinguishable from, the class action device. Third,
the factors that the commissioner of corporations should use in deter-
mining whether to seek restitution or damages for private individuals
will be discussed. 22
Following a complete examination of the background, nature, and
appropriate usage of the new 25530(b) public action, the note will ex-
amine the relative efficacy of the 25530(b) public action, the private
action (which will most likely be a class action), and the consolidated
action in meeting the criteria of deterrence, individual redress, and ju-
dicial economy.2 3 The rationale of each of these criteria and the re-
spective order of their importance will be briefly discussed. 24  It will
be concluded that the court must consider these three criteria in their
relative order of importance on a case-by-case basis to ascertain the ap-
propriate alternative in each instance in which a private action and a
public action compete to provide private relief.
Adoption and Application of Section 25530(b)
Adoption
The genesis of section 25530(b) is traceable to the attempt by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to establish its right
to seek restitution for violations of the SEC's rule lOb-5 15 in the early
1960's. The SEC, like the California commissioner of corporations un-
der the repealed California securities regulation law,26 had only the au-
thority to seek an injunction whenever a violation of the federal secu-
such investors would otherwise be without an adequate or effective remedy." MAs
& VOLK, supra note 1, § 14.10[1], at 14-72.
21. See text accompanying notes 53-81 infra.
22. See text accompanying notes 82-87 infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 110-13 infra.
24. See text accompanying notes 102-09 infra.
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1942), pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The
rule declares unlawful the employment of fraudulent schemes, the making of material
misrepresentations or half-truths, or the carrying on of fraudulent practices "in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security" by using interstate commerce, the mails,
or a securities exchange. Id.
26. Prior to the enactment of the Corporate Securities Law of 1968, the commis-
sioner of corporations, pursuant to now repealed section 26101 of the Corporations
Code, was allowed only to seek an injunction against activity giving rise to civil liability.
The former section 26101 was replaced by section 25530(a). See Cal. Stat. 1949, ch.
384, § 1, at 720 (repealed by Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 88, § 2, at 243). Section 25530(a)
was taken intact from section 408 of the Uniform Securities Act. Under section 25530
(a) the commissioner of corporations may seek a receiver or conservator for the defend-
ant's assets in addition to a request for injunctive relief.
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rities law had occurred or was about to occur. 27  Questioning the wis-
dom of leaving vindication of the public interest for violation of civil
liability securities laws solely to private actions for damages or restitu-
tion, the SEC sought a more effective remedy than the statutorily
granted injunctive power.28 The SEC found a restitutionary remedy
for itself by relying on two Supreme Court decisions which allowed fed-
eral agencies with only statutory injunctive powers to seek restitution
for private individuals.2 The rationale of the Court in these two cases
was that once the equitable power of a court is invoked by the request
for injunctive relief, the court is free to "provide complete relief in light
of the statutory purposes."30  As a result, the SEC sought and was
granted the right to restitutionary relief in a series of cases in the mid-
dle 1960's.a1
Even though only one SEC decision was final32 when the draft-
ers of the California Corporate Securities Law met in 1967 to begin
their deliberations, they must have thought that a public cause of ac-
tion for private relief was a necessary complement3 3 to private litigation
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. 78u(e) (1970).
28. See 6 L. Loss, SEcurrms REGULATION 3973-77 (2d ed. Supp. 1969) therein-
after cited as 6 Loss]; Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits for Violation of
Rule 10b-5, 79 HARv. L. Rrv. 656 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Ancillary Relief]. For
the earliest advocation of SEC restitution actions, see Comment, The Prospects for
Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE LJ. 1120,
1158-59 (1950).
29. See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960) (restitu-
tion of wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328
U.S. 395 (1946) (restitution of excessive rents pursuant to Emergency Price Control
Act).
30. Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
31. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971) (complaint filed 1965); SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F.
Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (complaint filed 1965); SEC v. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608
(D.P.R. 1966).
32. See SEC v. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608, 613-14 (D.P.R. 1966). It is germane
to add that the Wong decision gave restitution to the investment company involved and
not to individual investors. Subsequently, the decisions in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), and SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp.
257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), did not explicitly provide for restitution to injured investors after
a contested judgment. In Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. a fund was established with the prof-
its made on the insider trading from which plaintiffs could draw after civil liability
was established in their favor in a subsequent action. 446 F.2d at 1307-08. The
judgment in Golconda Mining Co. was consented to by the defendant. The defendant
deposited the profits with a court-appointed trustee who was to locate all persons en-
titled to share in the funds. 327 F. Supp. at 258-60. The SEC's experience in these
cases and in similar cases indicates a great reluctance on the part of the SEC to seek
relief beyond disgorgement of the profits. The rationale for this is primarily the
SEC's reluctance to become a "collection agency." See 6 Loss, supra note 28, at 3976.
33. The section 25530(b) remedy is complementary to private litigation because
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for securities law violations giving rise to civil liability. 4 A goal of the
new section 25530(b) governmental remedy was to ensure that a viola-
tor of the civil liability provisions of the new law was deterred as fully
as possible from similar conduct in the future. 35  As a federal appellate
court was later to say of the appropriateness of such governmental re-
lief:
This litigation is not a private affair involving those with
whom the defendants had the transactions. The investors were not
parties to the suit. It was commenced by -the SEC as a law en-
forcement agency in the public interest and to enforce the securities
laws. The injunction against future violations, while of some de-
terrent force, is only a partial remedy since it does not correct the
consequences of past conduct. To permit the return of the un-
claimed funds, a portion of the illicit profits, would impair the full
impact of the deterrent force that is essential if adequate enforce-
ment of the securities acts is to be achieved. 36
Thus, section 25530(b) of the new securities law was seemingly
born of a need to ensure deterrence of securities laws' violations by
depriving the violator of his tainted gain, since private litigation was
not always an efficient method of forcing him to disgorge illicit prof-
its." Realizing also that the courts could not be depended upon to
grant such ancillary relief as restitution or damages in the governmental
injunction proceedings, the drafters thought it necessary to codify the
remedy to ensure its availability to the commissioner of corporations.
Application
The Statutory Use Restriction of 25530(b)
Section 25530(b) does not give the commissioner of corporations
the authority to seek restitution or damages in all actions brought to
enjoin a securities violation giving rise to civil liability. This provision
seems to manifest an awareness of the SEC's experience with the resti-
tutionary remedy, the appropriateness of which was seriously ques-
it is "not . . intended to be a substitute for private litigation." MARSH & VOLK, supra
note 1, § 14.10[1], at 14-73. However, this remedy is only to be used "where [private]
relief is impractical in an ordinary civil action." Id. at 14-72.
34. The drafters of the proposed federal securities code have also recognized the
need for such a remedy. A provision in the new draft reads: "In an action created
by or based on a violation of this Code, whether or not brought by the Commission,
the court has the authority of a court of equity to grant appropriate ancillary or other
relief, including an accounting, a receivership of the defendant or the defendants' assets,
and restitution." ALI FED. SECURIMS CODE § 1515(i) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1974).
35. See J. SCHUTZBANK & J. ANDREws, CALIFORNIA CORPORATE SEcuRITEs LAw
ANALYSIS § 1.11, at 7 (1968).
36. SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
37. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 14.10[1], at 14-72.
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tioned as a result of the famous Texas Gulf Sulphur case, 8 and to
agree 9 with those commentators who felt that such relief is justified
only "when there are numerous injured investors with relatively small
claims who are likely to be unaware of their rights or unwilling to incur
litigation costs. '40  Rather, a court may only award restitution or dam-
ages in a section 25530 governmental injunctive action when "the court
finds that enforcement of the rights of such persons by private civil
action, whether by class action or otherwise, would be so burdensome
or expensive as to be impractical."4 1
The First Application of 25530(b)
The commissioner of corporations exercised his prerogative under
section 25530(b) for the first time in People v. Pallan.42  The com-
plaint, filed by the commissioner through his legal representative, the
attorney general," alleged four violations of the Corporate Securities
Law in connection with the sale of securities in the form of limited part-
nership interests in airpark developments. In addition to an injunction
to stop the sale of the securities and the appointment of a receiver for
the defendants' assets, 4 the complaint sought restitution or damages
for all injured investors pursuant to section 25530(b). The necessity
for such relief in the Pallan case was thought to be justified by the fol-
lowing factors: (1) many investors were not aware of the wrongs com-
mitted against them; (2) the investors were unrelated and geographically
distant so as to make joint litigation difficult; (3) the individual invest-
ments were not large enough to provoke civil action; and (4) judicial
economy dictated a single action.4 5  The complaint in effect alleged
that the "enforcement of the rights of such persons, whether by class
38. 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). See note 31
supra.
39. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 14.10[1], at 14-72.
40. 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5, § 10.2(2), at'
238-39 (1974); see Comment, Private Remedies Available Under Rule lOb-5, 20 Sw.
LJ. 620, 630 (1966); Cary, Book Review, 75 HARv. L. REv. 857, 861 (1962), reviewing
6 Loss, supra note 27. See generally Note, Ancillary Relief, supra note 27, at 656;
Comment, SEC Enforcement of the Rule lOb-5 Duty to Disclose Material Information
-Remedies and the Texas Gulf Sulphur Case, 65 MicH. L. REv. 944 (1967); Note,
Texas Gulf Sulphur: The Question of Remedy, 65 Nw. U.L REv. 486 (1970).
41. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25530(b) (West Supp. 1974).
42. Civil No. 294313 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, Cal., filed July 25, 1973).
43. The attorney general is empowered to act as attorney for the commissioner
of corporations. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25606 (West Supp. 1974).
44. These remedies are provided for in the California Corporations Code. Id. §
25530(a).
45. Complaint at 24-25, People v. Pallan, Civil No. 294313 (Super. Ct. Santa
Clara County, Cal., filed July 25, 1973).
action or otherwise, would be so burdensome or expensive as to be im-
practical."
Approximately seven months after the filing of the government's
complaint, a class action was brought against the same defendants based
on nearly identical causes of action. 46 The private complaint prayed for
restitution or damages for all investors in the airpark development proj-
ects, the same class of individuals for whom the commissioner of cor-
porations sought relief under section 25530(b).
The two Pallan actions clearly demonstrate the dilemma raised by
the adoption of section 25530(b). Although the Pallan court has yet
to resolve this competition between the public 25530(b) remedy and
the private class action,4 7 there seem to be three possible alternatives:
(1) to abate the class action, allowing the government suit to proceed
against the defendants; (2) to strike the prayer for restitution or dam-
ages from the government action, certifying the class action to proceed;
or (3) to consolidate the government action and the private class ac-
tion. It is suggested that the decision as to the appropriate alternative
can only be made after considering the three main criteria for litiga-
tion designed to vindicate a violation of the securities law: (1) deter-
rence; (2) individual redress; and (3) judicial economy. The rele-
vance and application of these criteria will be discussed in a later sec-
tion.4"
The Broader Implications of the 25530(b) Issue
As discussed previously, section 25530(b) was included in the
new Corporate Securities Law because case law was not dispositive of
the right of a court to award ancillary restitutionary relief in a govern-
mental injunctive action.4 9 The state of the law has since changed,
however. In the recent case of People v. Superior Court (Jayhill
Corp.)," the California Supreme Court explicitly recognized the right
of a court of equity to award appropriate ancillary relief once the court's
powers have been invoked by an injunction:
In the absence of . . . a [statutory] restriction a court of
equity may exercise the full range of its inherent powers in order
to accomplish complete justice between the parties, restoring if nec-
essary the status quo ante as nearly as may be achieved. In partic-
46. Jung v. Pallan, Civil No. 304276 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara, County, Cal., filed
Feb. 20, 1974).
47. Some of the defendants in People v. Pallan have gone into bankruptcy, forcing
surcease of any litigation against them. But the two competing actions are proceeding
against those defendants who have not declared bankruptcy.
48. See text accompanying notes 102-09 infra.
49. See text accompanying notes 25-37 supra.
50. 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973).
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ular, in an action [to enjoin false or misleading advertising] by the
Attorney General under section 17535 [of the Business and Pro-
fessions Code] a trial court has the inherent power -to order, as a
form of ancillary relief, that the defendants make or offer to make
restitution to the customers found -to have been defrauded. 51
Thus, any state statute which authorizes an injunctive power in a state
agency without restricting ancillary relief may give rise to competition
between a public and a private action for the right to compensate private
individuals wronged by a violation of a statute creating civil liability. 52
Although the focus of this note is to determine the appropriate course
of action when private and public actions compete to afford private re-
lief for violations of section 25530(b), it is clear that such a determina-
tion will be applicable as well to the competition of these same rem-
edies engendered by the Jayhill decision.
The Nature of the Section 25530(b) Action
Traditionally, government agencies have been unable to represent
private citizens where only private rights have been invaded.53 Re-
51. Id. at 286, 507 P.2d at 1402, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (citations omitted). The
court made it clear that the amendment of this injunctive provision did not create the
authority for a trial court to order restitution. The amendment only recognized the ex-
istence of this previously dormant power. 'The Legislature has now explicitly recog-
nized the foregoing inherent power in an amendment to section 17535 [of the Business
and Professions Code] declaring that '[t]he court may make such orders or judgments
... which may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property,
real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of any practice in this chapter
declared to be unlawful.' ([Cal. Stat.] 1972, ch. 244, [§§ 1-2, at 494].) In light of
its legislative history, we hold that the amendment was intended not to .create a new
power in the trial court but simply to clarify existing law on this point." 9 Cal. 3d
at 287 n.1, 507 P.2d at 1402 n.1, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 194 n.1; see CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 17535 (West Supp. 1974). 'See generally Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d 198 (1974).
52. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17070 (West 1964) (civil liability for
unfair trade practices).
53. In the past states have attempted to represent private individuals by suing as
parens patriae. The United States Supreme Court recently held that such suits are not
sufficient, at least in an antitrust context, to get the states' attorneys general into court
absent a specific economic injury to the state itself. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405
U.S. 251 (1972). Nevertheless, the requirement of specific economic injury to the states
has been met in a great number of instances; consequently, the state has been allowed
to represent the class in a class action since the state itself is a member of the aggrieved
class. See, e.g., Illinois v. Bristol-Myers Co., 470 F.2d 1276, 1277-78 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 871 (1971); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Ac-
tions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 284, modified in part, 333 F. Supp. 291, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Indiana v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 51 F.R.D. 493, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Minnesota v.
United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 565 (D. Minn. 1968).
Governmental agencies have been allowed to bring class actions as representatives
for other governmental entities similarly situated but have not been allowed to include
cently, however, a government right to represent private individuals has
been recognized where the right has either been statutorily created54
or where the courts have held that courts of equity may award restitu-
tion to private individuals in governmental injunctive actions.5" The
difficulty is that courts and commentators have not yet satisfactorily
classified such governmental actions and thus have failed to indicate
the procedural requirements of such actions. Until such classification
is made, the res judicata effect of such actions will remain uncertain.
One commentator has referred to the section 25530(b) govern-
mental action as a "class action."5 6  In contrast, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court has indicated that governmental actions seeking private
relief are only "in the nature of a class action. ' 57 This same court men-
tioned the need for procedural requirements for such suits, but only
the general public as part of the class if the injury to government and private individual
is different. See generally City of Akron v. Laub Baking Co., CCH 1972 TRADE CAS.
73,930 (N.D. Ohio); In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 52
F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973).
54. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25530(b) (West Supp. 1974); New Jersey Con-
sumer Fraud Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 to -20 (1964 & Supp. 1974) (restitution
-attorney general); New York City Consumer Protection Law of 1969, NEW YoRY,
N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 64, tit. A, §§ 2203d-1.0 to -8.0 (Supp. 1974) (restitu-
tion--Commissioner of Consumer Affairs). Legislation was proposed in 1970-1971 to
allow the Federal Trade Commission to bring governmental representative proceedings.
S. 3201, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 4809, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). In De-
cember of 1974 the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, containing a provision which allows the Federal Trade Commission to seek relief
for private individuals, was passed by Congress. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act § 206, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975), amending 15 U.S.C.
45(a) (1970). See generally Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 481-84 (E.D.N.Y.
1968), rev'd, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971); Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201
F. Supp. 934, 937 (D. Mass. 1962); 3 L. Loss, SEcUmTiEs REGULATION 1824-29 (2d
ed. 1961); 6 Loss, supra note 28, at 3970-77; Sebert, Obtaining Monetary Redress for
Consumers Through Action by the Federal Trade Commission, 57 MINN. L. REV. 225
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Sebert]; Wade & Kamenshine, Restitution for Defrauded
Consumers: Making the Remedy Effective Through Suit by Government Agency, 37
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1031 (1969); Note, New York City's Alternative to the Consumer
Class Action: The Government as Robin Hood, 9 HARv. J. LEG Is. 301 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as The Government as Robin Hood]; Ancillary Relief, supra note 28,
at 656.
55. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960);
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC v. Golconda Mining CO., 327 F. Supp. 257
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); SEC v. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608 (D.P.R. 1966); People v. Superior
Ct. (Jayhill COrp.), 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973); State
v. Ralph Williams' Nw. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 265, 510 P.2d 233
(1973).
56. See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW AND
RULES 68 (1968).
57. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 539, 279 A.2d 640, 649 (1971).
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gave the following scant guidance: "Although the procedural aspects
of such a suit need not be passed upon at this time, guidance may be
found in [the New Jersey statutes] which relate generally to class ac-
tions. ' 5'
The importance of determining the nature of governmental ac-
tions seeking relief for private individuals is that once these actions are
examined and understood, the procedural requirements of such actions
can be formulated. Without adequate procedural safeguards, the stat-
utorily created 25530(b) governmental action and the similar com-
mon law action will be subject to a due process attack if judgments ren-
dered under them are later alleged as res judicata against the private
individuals.59
What, then, is the nature of the section 25530(b) governmental
action? At first glance the action seems strikingly similar to the class
action 0 now allowed in many state6 and in all federal courts:62 the
58. Id.
59. For a discussion of the reasons why the governmental action would be subject
to a due process attack if it sought to bind private individuals without meeting procedural
safeguards of due process, see text accompanying notes 65-81 infra. The doctrine of
res judicata provides that a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is con-
clusive on the parties to the litigation in any subsequent action involving the same causes
of action. In essence, res judicata ensures that the controversy between the parties is
permanently resolved. See M. GREEN, BASIC CVIL PROCEDURE 201 (1972).
60. Although only California law is at issue in this note, it will be necessary to
the ensuing discussion of the class action to include some law of the federal courts on
the class action. The supplementation of the California law on class actions with the
federal law is necessary to fill the gaps in current California law and to provide guidance
on the constitutional requirements of all class actions. "[Riecent California decisions
(Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, [709, 433 P.2d 732, 742, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724,
734 (1967)]; Vasquez v. Superior Court, [4 Cal. 3d 800, 821, 484 P.2d 964, 977,] 94
Cal. Rptr. 796, [809 (1971)]) have indicated that California practice should closely
parallel the federal rules. A discussion of federal cases, which are more numerous and
explanative than California cases in this area of the law ... is therefore beneficial in
understanding not only federal practice, but also in predicting and understanding future
California decisions." R. DEGNAN, REMEDES AND CLASS AcrIONs 33 (1971).
There is good reason for the California Supreme Court's desire to use the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure rule 23 as guidance to shape the California class action rule.
The procedural requirements of rule 23 may well be constitutional mandates to which
all class actions, state and federal, would have to adhere. The recent United States Su-
preme Court decision concerning the class action device, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156 (1974), raised this possibility but fell short of deciding which, if any, of
the procedural requirements in rule 23 are constitutionally mandated.
61. For an excellent discussion of the various state class action statutes, see Starrs,
The Consumer Class Action: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L REv. 407 (1969).
For the provisions of the California class action rule, see CAL. CODE CIv. PROC.
§ 382 (West 1973). The California rule was based on the model provided by the 1848
Field Code, and its language is substantially different from the federal rule which was
completely rewritten in 1966. See Starrs, supra at 433-34. California's present statute
government would be representing the injured parties (the class) in
a single action for the purpose of gaining for the class an award of resti-
tution or damages. Upon closer examination, however, the 25530(b)
action loses its similarity to the traditional class action. A requirement
common to all class actions is that the class representative be able to
show an injury to himself that is similar to the injury sustained by the
other members of the class.63  In other words, the representative must
be a member of the class he is attempting to represent. Neither the
commissioner of corporations nor the attorney general could be consid-
ered to have been directly injured by activity violative of the securities
laws. Their sole interest in attempting to represent the class is to en-
sure through litigation that the violator is forced to disgorge the ill-
gotten gain, thereby deterring further misconduct on his part. If the
attorney general were to seek certification of the action as a class ac-
tion, the court would be bound by precedent to conclude as a matter
of law that certification was impermissible.64
The failure of the section 25530(b) governmental action to fit
into the traditional mold of the class action device does not preclude
the action. Nevertheless, this failure does mean that the procedural
requirements of a class action6" do not necessarily apply to the
reads: "When the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons,
or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 382 (West 1973).
62. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(a).
63. See, e.g., Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc., 463 F.2d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 1972);
Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704-13, 433 P.2d 732, 739-45, 63 Cal. Rptr.
724, 731-37 (1967).
64. See California Gas Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., 50 Cal. 2d 844, 330
P.2d 778 (1958); Parker v. Bowron, 40 Cal. 2d 344, 254 P.2d 6 (1953); Greater West-
chester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. App. 3d 523, 91 Cal. Rptr.
720 (1970).
65. The minimum procedural requirements of a class action are thought to be:
(1) adequate representation; and (2) notice to the members of the class of the pendency
of the action. Procedural requirements must be distinguished from maintenance require-
ments. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 23(a) sets forth three prerequisites to the
maintenance of a class action: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law and fact common to the class; and (3)
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class. Although the necessity of adequate representation is also listed in subdivi-
sion (a) of the rule, it appears to be distinguishable from the other criteria of the sub-
division in that it is designed to ensure that the procedure fairly protects the rights of
absent individuals. The additional procedural requirement, notice, is set forth in subdi-
vision (c)(2) of rule 23. Further requirements of (c)(2) are that the notice advise
each member that he has a right to be excluded; that the judgment favorable or not will
include him, absent a request for exclusion; and that each individual may enter an ap-
pearance through counsel upon request. These further requirements are probably not
of constitutional stature, and consequently state class actions would be free to deviate
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25530(b) action or to any governmental action seeking relief for pri-
vate individuals. There is, however, a compelling reason that the pro-
cedural requirements of the class action should apply as well to this
type of governmental action, for without the procedural safeguards of
due process set forth in the rules governing class actions, the govern-
ment's action would seem to lack res judicata effect with respect to
those individuals it seeks to protect. The concept of due process in
the American system of jurisprudence is based on the fundamental
proposition that an individual is guaranteed his day in court whenever
rights peculiar to him are to be adjudicated. 6  The class action is al-
lowed to violate this most basic guarantee by granting complete res ju-
dicata effect for or against absent individuals, 6 7 but only if the class of
individuals is fairly and adequately represented68 and the members of
the class are given the best notice practicable of the pendency of the
action. 69 These procedural requirements are designed to ensure that
from these requirements of federal class actions. See Frankel, Some Preliminary Ob-
servations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 45-46 (1968).
66. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940).
67. See id. at 41.
68. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) (4). "Mhe courts . have fashioned this re-
quirement into a jurisdictional standard of due process." Note, Consumer Class Actions
with a Multistate Class: A Problem of Jurisdiction, 25 HAST.S L.J. 1411, 1434
(1974).
69. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2). It could be argued that no notice is required
of a 25530(b) governmental action since notice is not explicitly levied against all class
actions under rule 23. Rule 23 distinguishes between three different types of class ac-
tions. Subdivision (b) (1) is applicable to situations wherein separate adjudications
would prejudice absent members of the class or the defendant would be subjected to in-
consistent results from separate adjudications. Subdivision (b) (2) permits a class action
where the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds applicable
to the entire class. Subdivision (b) (3) is the more general provision under which most
class actions are brought. The maintenance of a (b) (3) class action requires the court
to find that there are common questions of law or fact and that the class action is supe-
rior to other available methods for the adjudication of the controversy. These require-
ments are in addition to the requirements of (a) (1). Subdivision (b) (3) actions in-
clude all class actions that are brought for money damages. Thus, the 25530(b) action
would have to be compared with a (b) (3) class action. But, one could argue that the
due process requirements of a 25530(b) action are not to be found under (b) (3), but
rather under (b) (2) since the latter section is applicable to class actions which seek in-
junctive relief. No requirements of notice have been explicitly levied against the (b) (2)
class action (see id. 23 (c) (2)), although the question of whether notice is constitutionally
necessary in (b)(2) actions is an open one. See Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in
Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 313-17 (1973). It could therefore be reasoned that since
the 25530(b) governmental action is partially an injunctive action and therefore anal-
ogous to (b)(2) class actions, that the necessity for notice is obviated. This line of
reasoning is somewhat illusory when it is considered that the 25530(b) action's claim
for restitution or damages would dwarf the injunctive portion of the prayer for relief.
If notice is constitutionally necessary to a (b)(3) class action (see note 60 supra), it
is doubtful that the attorney general and commissioner of corporations could escape that
requirement in this manner.
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such actions meet the minimum standards of due process of law,
thereby allowing the class action to result in a judgment binding on the
entire class even though no members of the class, except the repre-
sentative(s), participate in the litigation;7" without these procedural
safeguards, the class action could deprive absent individuals of due
process of law.71
The rationale for placing these procedural requirements upon the
class action would seem to apply equally to the 25530(b) govern-
mental action if the attorney general seeks a judgment that would be
binding on the class. 72 The attorney general is representing a class
of aggrieved individuals. The only difference between the attorney
general's action and the traditional ("de jure') class action is that the
attorney general is not a member of the class he seeks to represent.
The fact that the attorney general is not a member of the class leads
to the conclusion that the 25530(b) action is in fact, though not by
law, a class action.
Yet even if a governmental action such as the 25530(b) action
may be appropriately termed a "de facto" class action, the issue of
whether the procedural requirements of a class action should be ap-
plied thereto, does not turn on any difference in the natures of the de
facto and de jure class actions. Rather, the need to ensure proce-
dural due process depends on whether the attorney general seeks a
judgment binding on the individuals he represents. It is suggested that
the attorney general will be compelled to bring the action as a de facto
class action as numerous difficulties would arise if the action did not
provide procedural due process to absent individuals and bind them by
the judgment. A judgment in a 25530(b) action in which the attor-
ney general made no attempt to prove that his representation was ade-
quate and to provide notice the members of the class would not be res
judicata to the class.73 If the government lost in a 25530(b) action,
70. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
71. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1786
(1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
72. For a discussion of the necessity for applying the procedural requirements of
the class action to governmental representative proceedings, see Sebert, supra note 54,
at 264-67, and The Government as Robin Hood, supra note 54, at 323-26. "[O]ne
sensible solution .. . is to apply to an FTC consumer redress action many of the rules
and procedures established for private class actions under new Federal Rule 23." Sebert,
supra note 54, at 265. "At the very least, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment would require an adequate system of notice such as that prescribed in Rule
23(c)(2)." The Government as Robin Hood, supra note 54, at 325.
73. It is again best to remember that adequate representation and notice are as-
sumed to be constitutional requirements for all class actions, but the Supreme Court of
the United States recently failed to turn this assumption into fact. See note 60 supra.
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a private individual for whom restitution or damages was sought would
be free to initiate his own private civil action, since to hold otherwise
would be totally inconsistent with the notion of due process of law.74
Similarly, a private individual could not be conclusively bound by a set-
tlement between the plaintiff-government and the defendant unless the
individual accepted his share of the settlement in lieu of his right to
sue the defendant. 75 Even a favorable judgment for the government
in a 25530(b) action would not conclusively bind the injured individ-
uals if the amount of recovery available to those individuals was insuf-
ficient to move them to partake of their respective shares of the judg-
ment fund. These indiviudals would then be free to pursue their own
action, collectively or independently, for a greater monetary award.76
In sum, a private individual included in a 25530(b) action will
not be bound unless he chooses to be bound. This failure to bind
members of the class is likely to occur absent a favorable decision for
the commissioner of corporations and attorney general and a sufficient
award of restitution or damages. It is clear that the net effect of such
an action would be the possibility of a multiplicity of suits against the.
same defendant based on the same violation of law.77 Conversely, if
the 25530(b) governmental action were treated as a de facto class
action, requiring notice to the class78 and proof that the attorney
74. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950);
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
75. This would be a matter of pure contract. The private individual would forego
the right to sue, a right he retained since he was not bound by the governmental suit.
The consideration for relinquishing his right to sue would be an award of money from
the defendant, an award to which the individual had no previous right since he had not
actually gained a judgment against the defendant and might not be able to do so in the
future.
76. See The Government as Robin Hood, supra note 54, at 324.
77. The possibility of exposing a defendant to double liability has been equally
as troubling for commentators who have analyzed government actions designed to pro-
cure redress for private individuals. See Sebert, supra note 54, at 265; The Government
as Robin Hood, supra note 54, at 324-25.
78. The attorney general and commissioner of corporations would have to make
a joint effort to determine the names and addresses of the members of the class and
then would have to give notice to those individuals. The appropriate method of giving
notice in California class actions is an open question. The new California consumer
class action allows notice by publication if personal notification is unreasonably ex-
pensive or if it is impossible to notify all members of the class personally. See CAL.
Cirv. CODE § 1781 (West 1973). The quandry is that notice by publication may be in-
sufficient to satisfy due process standards as implied in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that individual notice to all
members of the class who can be identified through reasonable effort is an unambiguous
requirement of Rule 23. To ensure a judgment binding on the class as res judicata, the
attorney general and commissioner of corporations would be best advised to provide no-
tice through the mails. For guidelines concerning the content of the notice, see FED.
R. Civ. P. 23 and CAL. Crv. CoDE § 1781(e) (West 1973). The notice should, under
general would adequately represent the class, 79 then a favorable judg-
ment would bind all the injured individuals regardless of the monetary
award.8 0 Similarly, an unfavorable judgment would bind all members
of the class, thereby protecting the defendant from further litigation
and conserving judicial resources by making further litigation impos-
sible.8 '
Treating a 25530(b) action as a de facto class action should
clearly be preferred and would seem to be compelled. The end result
of such an action, the complete resolution of the conflict engendered
by an alleged violation of the securities law, is more reasonable than
the alternative, which would almost certainly lead to a multiplicity of
suits and double liability.
Factors to be Considered in Determining Whether to Append
a Section 25530(b) Claim Onto an Injunctive Action
The "de facto" class action approach to the use of 25530(b),
though necessary, will place a greater burden on the attorney general
and commissioner of corporations than if the action was allowed to pro-
ceed without the safeguards of the class action or if the 25530(b) claim
for restitution or damages was simply not appended to the injunctive
proceeding. The increased burden arises, of course, from the necessity
of ensuring that adequate and fair representation is provided to the
these nearly identical guidelines, advise the members that they have a right to request
exclusion; that the judgment, favorable or not, will include all members who do not re-
quest exclusion; and that any member of the class who does not request exclusion may
enter an appearance through counsel.
79. In general, courts would not question the fairness and adequacy of the attorney
general's representation, absent any conflicts of interest that might arise between the
class and the two state agencies. In some instances however, it might be argued that
the attorney general and commissioner of corporations might be less vigorous than the
private individual in pressing a suit. The attorney general and commissioner of corpora-
tions should, like a private representative, have the burden of proving to the court that
their representation will be vigorous. Also, conflicts of interest may arise between the
class and the government after the initial determination of adequate representation
which would deprive the class of that protection. For example, a classic conflict could
arise where the attorney general and commissioner of corporations wanted to settle
rather than to litigate to judgment while the class desired the litigation to continue to
judgment. In those instances, the court should use the procedure of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure rule 23 which requires court supervision of proposed dismissals, settle-
ments, and compromises. See generally Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and
the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws,
116 U. PA. L. REv. 889 (1968).
80. See Sebert, supra note 54, at 265; The Government as Robin Hood, supra note
54, at 325.
81. Cf. Sebert, supra note 54, at 266-67; The Government as Robin Hood, supra
note 54, at 325.
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class and that proper notice is given to all class members. 82 In view of
this increased burden, one must ascertain the circumstances in which the
commissioner of corporations and attorney general should seek restitu-
tion or damages.
The language of 25530(b) itself provides the initial guidance:
"T]he court shall have jurisdiction to award appropriate relief. . . if
the court finds that enforcement. by private civil action, whether
by class action or otherwise, would be so burdensome or expensive as
to be impractical." The statute goes no further in describing what is
meant by "burdensome," "expensive," or "impractical" and thus leaves
open to a wide range of interpretations the question of when a
25530(b) claim is appropriate. As mentioned earlier, however, the
sole function of the 25530(b) remedy is to ensure that litigation is in-
stituted to deter conduct violative of the civil liability provisions of the
securities law.83  Thus, the attorney general and commissioner of
corporations must determine whether private litigation will be initiated;
if not, then the 25530(b) remedy must be instituted to ensure de-
terrence.
Whether or not private litigation will be initated will depend on
a number of factors. The potential monetary recovery and size of the
class are both crucial factors. As mentioned previously, the drafters
of the new securities law were thought to have concluded that the
25530(b) remedy was most appropriate where the amounts recover-
able by each individual would be relatively small.8 4 Although poten-
tially small individual damage recoveries are disincentives to private
litigation, since any recovery would be lost in the payment of litigation
costs, it becomes less likely that a private class action would be "ex-
pensive" or "burdensome" to the class as the possible monetary
recovery for each injured person increases. Indeed, at some point the
possible monetary award might be so great on an individual basis that
the private class action itself would give way to individual litigation.
However, this is unlikely in the context of a securities law violation as
individual recoveries in securities actions are normally quite small.88
The size of the class will, of course, also be an important inde-
pendent variable in the equation of when private litigation will be
initiated to provide the necessary deterrence for the misconduct. The
larger the class, the more likely it is that the total damage or restitu-
82. See text accompanying notes 72-81 supra.
83. See text accompanying notes 25-37 supra.
84. See text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.
85. "Because most securities cases involve hundreds of class members who typi-
cally possess only small individual claims, the class action provides a useful mechanism
for enforcing the policies underlying the securities laws . .. ." WRiGHT & MLLER,
supra note 71, § 1781, at 87.
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tionary fund would be of considerable dollar size. The larger the fund,
the more likely it is that private attorneys would be willing to represent
the class as counsel and to lay the necessary groundwork of legal pro-
ceedings.86 The amount of monetary damage to each individual and
the size of the class are, of course, inextricably linked and, in some
cases, even though the possible recovery to each individual would be
minute, the size of the class would be sufficiently large to provide a
fund adequate to attract attorneys willing to initiate and prosecute the
action for the class. The first task then, of the attorney general and
commissioner of corporations should be to consider the size of the class,
the possible individual sums recoverable, and the total judgment fund
generated by the interplay of these two factors.
There are other important factors which must be considered in
addition to the possible amount of monetary recovery. The size and
power of the defendants should be considered in determining whether
or not private litigation will be initiated to effectuate deterrence. A
single defendant with economic strength or a class of defendants each
with economic strength may deter private litigation, thus making the
25530(b) remedy the remaining hope for deterrence. The economic
position of the injured individuals must also be considered: the com-
missioner of corporations and attorney general should be more willing
to seek restitution or damages where the injured individuals are lower
on the income scale and less likely to be able to afford the costs of
the litigation.
Additional factors which do not necessarily deter private litigation
but which heighten the need for enforcement of the securities laws
should be taken into account by the two state agencies in determining
whether or not to append a 25530(b) claim for restitution or damages
onto an injunctive action. The commissioner of corporations must con-
sider the case in relation to the overall enforcement scheme of the
86. Attorneys' fees are awarded from the judgment fund created, and generally at-
torneys' fees awards increase as the judgment funds increase. The incentive of a size-
able award of attorneys' fees has been the main motivation used to get attorneys to ini-
tiate and prosecute class actions. The possibility of a protean award of attorneys' fees
is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, the incentive ensures that litigation
occurs in areas where, if not for the class action, the action might not have been
brought. But the curse is that attorneys chasing the classs action pot of gold bring in-
meritorious actions, hoping for a healthy settlement award in return for the promise to
not further vex the defendant. The so-called strike suit has done a good deal to lessen
the reputation of the class action and to lessen the role of the class action as a social
tool for the redress of mass wrongs. See generally Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The
"Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L. REV. 658 (1956); Patrick & Cher-
ner, Rule 23 and the Class Action for Damages: A Reply to the Report of the Ameri-
can College of Trial Lawyers, 28 Bus. LAw. 1097 (1973); Comment, Recovery of Dam-
ages in Class Actions, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 768, 776-79 (1965).
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agency. If the action will resolve a controversial aspect of the securi-
ties law which the commissioner deems important to the overall
efficiency of the securities regulation framework, the commissioner
should be more inclined to append the 25530(b) claim to ensure the
adjudication of the disputed point of law. The flagrancy of the offense
should also be considered. The difference between an intentional
breach of a securities law and a good faith mistake is substantial with
respect to the need for deterrence. The duration of the alleged viola-
tions is another factor for consideration. If the violative activity has
occurred over a lengthy span of time, the commissioner should be more
inclined to append the 25530(b) claim to ensure that litigation will be
initiated to effectuate deterrence. Last, the commissioner of corpora-
tions and attorney general must be aware of their limited resources and
should allocate their agencies' time according to the need for the
25530(b) remedy.8
Judicial Resolution of the Conflict Between the Private Class
Action and the 25530(b) Governmental Action
Previous discussion of the 25530(b) remedy focused on the
rationale for establishing a governmental right to seek monetary relief
for private individuals, 8 the nature of the 25530(b) action, 9 and the
factors to be considered by the commissioner of corporations in deter-
mining the circumstances in which the 25530(b) claim is appropriate.90
That discussion was designed to place the 25530(b) action in perspec-
tive, highlighting the function of the 25530(b) action as a complemen-
tary remedy to private litigation to ensure that a suit will always be
instituted to deter activity violative of the civil liability provisions of the
Corporate Securities Law of 1968. The function of this section is dif-
ferent in scope and focuses not on the adoption, application, or the
usage of the 25530(b) remedy, but on the difficulty that arises when
both a 25530(b) governmental action and a private class action seek
private relief for the same violative conduct.
The alternatives open to a court confronted with this competition
between a private de jure class action and a governmental 25530(b)
de facto class action are: (1) abatement of the private class action,
87. The fact that administrative agencies, such as the commissioner of ,corpora-
tions, have limited resources is a main reason for not allowing governmental representa-
tive actions to preempt the private causes of action. See Ford, Federal Rule 23 . A De-
vice for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rav. 501, 508 (1969);
Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CM. L. REV.
684, 720-21 (1941).
88. See text accompanying notes 25-37 supra.
89. See text accompanying notes 53-71 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 82-87 supra.
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allowing the 25530(b) action to proceed against the alleged violators
of the securities law; (2) certification of the private class action,
striking the prayer for restitution or damages from the governmental
injuctive action; or (3) consolidation of the two actions. As will be
shown, a judicial determination of the appropriate alternative will de-
pend, in general, on which of the alternative actions will provide the
optimal deterrent effect, individual redress, and judicial economy.91
The Superiority Requirement
Before considering these three factors in greater depth, it is neces-
sary to dispel any notion that a governmental 25530(b) action is
presumptively superior to the private class action device. Such a notion
may arise from the fact that a general requirement for the maintenance
of a class action in the federal courts is that the class action must be
found "superior" to other methods of adjudication of the dispute.9" Al-
though California courts have not explicitly adopted the superiority
requirement, the California Supreme Court has stated that Federal
Rule 23 is appropriate guidance for California courts attempting to
shape the state's class action law; therefore, it is possible that the
superiority requirement may be levied against future California class
actions.9"
91. See text accompanying notes 110-13 infra.
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
93. California courts have yet to apply explicitly the superiority requirement of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 23 to California class actions. Nonetheless, the
assumption is made herein that the California Supreme Court's approval in Daar v. Yel-
low Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 709, 433 P.2d 732, 742, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 734 (1967),
and Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 821, 484 P.2d 964, 977, 94 Cal. Rptr.
796, 809 (1971), of the use of the federal rule for guidance might compel courts of this
state to accept the superiority requirement, except in one already created exceptional cir-
cumstance. Under rule 23, if the parties may be joined, then the class action is not
the "superior" method for adjudication of the dispute. But, according to current Califor-
nia law, "[a] representative suit may be brought though the parties are not numerous
and it is in fact practicable (though inconvenient) to join all of them. This is on the
theory that the statute sets forth alternatives: A question of common interest, either (1)
of many persons, or (2) of parties so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them
in. The first alternative allows a class suit on behalf of 'many' persons even though
they are not too numerous to join .... ." 3 B. WrrKrN, CALIFORNmI PRocEDuRE, PLEAD-
rNG § 183, at 1854 (2d ed. 1971) (emphasis omitted); see Santa Clara County Con-
tractors & Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Santa Clara, 232 Cal. App. 2d 564, 568, 43
Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (1965); Renken v. Compton City School Dist., 207 Cal. App. 2d 106,
113, 24 Cal. Rptr. 347, 351 (1962); Jellen v. O'Brien, 89 Cal. App. 505, 509, 264 P.
1115, 1116 (1928). Thus, under California law a class action may be certified where
joinder is practicable and the class action is not superior to other adjudicative procedures.
Without refuting the validity of this point of law, it should be noted that the "superior"
requirement of rule 23 can still be assumed to be applicable to California class actions.
There are no California cases that hold that the class action will be allowed to proceed
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Courts and commentators alike have agreed that if joinder,9 4 inter-
vention, or consolidation of individual actions can be used to adjudicate
a controversy, then the class action device is not superior. 5 The pre-
sumption that was created in favor of the former procedures has been
broadened to include other alternative devices that compete with the
class action as a means of settling a legal controversy. Thus, where
relief has been available through a governmental unit, the presumption
may be that relief by the governmental unit is superior to a private class
action.96 Using this presumption in favor of governmental relief, the
argument could be made that the "superiority" requirement dictates
that 25530(b) be the exclusive means of seeking relief for private indi-
viduals injured by a violation of a securities law.
The presumption in favor of governmental relief must fail on at
least three grounds. First, the "superiority" requirement is more
appropriately interpreted as a balancing test between alternative pro-
cedures rather than an a priori position that the class action is the least
where intervention, consolidation, or relief by governmental agency is available. The
joinder exception, of arguable validity in light of current state law, may be considered
an aberration of the broad and imprecise language of section 382 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure (West 1973). The textual discussion of the superiority requirement
will rely heavily on the more expansive and explanative federal law.
94. As discussed in note 93 supra, a class action is appropriate in California even
if joinder is feasible. This will be treated as a questionable anomaly of California law.
Since the superiority requirement has not yet been specifically adopted by California
courts, the assumption is that it is either in operation incognito or might be adopted if
explicitly brought before a California court.
95. See, e.g., William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,
49 F.R.D. 35, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1969); School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267
F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Berley v. Dreyfus & Co., 43 F.R.D. 397, 398-
99 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); 3B J. MooRE, FFDERAL PRACTICE 23.45[3], at 23-811 to -814
(2d ed. 1969); WUGOHT & MILLER, supra note 66, § 1779.
96. Cf. Wechsler v. Southeastern Properties, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Since governmental representation suits brought to procure private relief are relatively
new devices, the problem of choosing between the governmental proceeding and the pri-
vate class has seldom appeared at the federal level. Previously, government injunctive
actions which garnered restitution for private individuals as part of a settlement had
competed with private class actions to a limited degree, and the decisions that followed
from that clash turned on the extent to which the government-gained settlements pre-
cluded the necessity for further litigation. For instance, in Wechsler v. Southeastern
Properties, Inc., the court held that a private class action could not be certified as the
attorney general of New York had already obtained a class-wide offer of restitution by
the seller of unregistered stock, precluding the necessity of further litigation. The de-
terminative factor for the court was that resitution was already available for the injured
investors so that a private class action would be redundant. The court was not answer-
ing the question of whether the private class action or the governmental action was to
be preferred to adjudicate the matter when both had been filed and neither had reached
a settlement or obtained a judgment.
desirable means of litigation:97 "'Superior' seems to imply a balancing
test. It does not seem to convey the idea that the drafters felt 'there
are better remedies' than the class action and class actions should only
be used in the last resort. '9 8  Indeed, if the proposition posed later
in this note is correct-that a court faced with a clash between a public
and a private action must weigh the factors of deterrence, individual
redress, and judicial economy in determining which should proceed-
the "superiority" requirement can only be viewed as a balancing test.
Second, the argument that governmental action should be used in lieu
of a class action wherever possible is based on the assumption that the
involved governmental agency has absolute discretion to bring an action
for private relief.99 Under section 25530(b), however, the commis-
97. See Comment, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REV. 539, 556 (1969).
98. Gould, Staff Report on the Consumer Class Action, in 4 STAFF STUDIES PRE-
PARED FOR THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CONSUMER JUSTICE 105 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Gould].
99. Cf. Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REv.
609, 636 (1971). A recent report prepared by the Committee on Class Actions of the
Section of Corporations, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association
concerning the consumer class action for monetary relief reads, in part, as follows: "Pri-
mary responsibility for the enforcement of Federal and state statutes designed for con-
sumer protection should be vested in officers or agencies charged with the duty of en-
forcement and provided with appropriate powers. Where there is such an agency or offi-
cer with adequate power under the act to seek or award direct monetary relief to con-
sumers injured by the violations, no private class actions for monetary relief should be
commenced except after prior reasonable notice to the agency or officer of the alleged
violation and intention to bring a private class action, and the failure of the agency or
officer to institute, and thereafter diligently prosecute appropriate proceedings to require
such direct monetary relief to consumers injured by the violations." Committee on
Class Actions, Recommendation Regarding Consumer Class Actions for Monetary Re-
lief, 29 Bus. LAw. 957, 958 (1974). The committee's recommendation would subor-
dinate the private class action to the governmental relief action. The committee's pro-
posal is roundly criticized by Beverly C. Moore, presently a member of Ralph Nader's
Corporate Accountability Research Group: "The critical problem here is that 'adequate
powers' require not merely statutory authorization for the agency to recover damages
for an injured class but also a budget sufficient to obtain such relief routinely. Thus
the Federal Trade Commission, which is typical of many existing state and federal agen-
cies in this respect, has the 'power' to obtain class reparations but seldom does, prefer-
ring in the vast majority of cases to opt for injunctive relief in order to spread its limited
enforcement resources over a larger number of cases. If, as is not unlikely, the agency
in the end drops its damage count in return for a consent settlement limited to prospec-
tive relief, the private litigant may have been seriously prejudiced by the intervening
delay . . . . Indeed, there would be little economic incentive for private attorneys to
identify potential class action cases at all if they were forced to 'hand over' any actions
discovered to a government agency." Moore, The A.B.A., The Congress and Class Ac-
tions: A Report, 3 CLASS ACTION REP. 36, 43-44 (1974). Moore's fundamental ground
for rejection of the committee's proposal is that diverse and independent centers of deci-
sionmaking are needed to check the arbitrary exercise of power. Id. at 44. In a final
sweeping indictment of the recommendation to grant the government the exclusive au-
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sioner of corporations and attorney general must prove to the court that
a private class action is so "burdensome" or "expensive!' as to be
"impractical" before the governmental action will be allowed to pro-
ceed to seek restitution or damages. The language of 25530(b) itself
indicates that neither the commissioner of corporation's action nor the
private class action is to be favored, but rather that there must be a
reasoned determination regarding either action in light of the existing
fact situation. Third, if the 25530(b) action is considered a de facto
class action, as it appears that it must, 100 then the competition to award
private relief would be between two class actions; the "superiority" re-
quirement would thus be rendered inapplicable as the only possible
means of adjudicating the dispute would be a class action. It would
follow that the two class actions would have to be compared with re-
spect to their relative efficacy in settling the controversy in light of
criteria thought necessary by a court.
The Applicable Criteria: Deterrence, Individual
Redress, and Judicial Economy
The applicable criteria for a suit brought pursuant to a violation
of the securities law for which civil liability has been created have been
set forth as deterrence, individual redress, and judicial economy. By
applying these three criteria to each of the available alternatives-the
25530(b) de facto class action, the private class action, and consolida-
tion of the two actions-a court could resolve the competition between
the two actions in favor of the alternative that best satisfies the criteria.
This approach, in effect, requires a balancing test, and it is suggested
that deterrence be given the greatest weight while judicial economy be
given the least weight of the three criteria.
The rationale for establishing these criteria and then declaring that
one criterion is of greater weight than another is simply a method of
designation of the goals, from greater to lesser importance, which a civil
thority to prosecute actions for private relief, Moore states: "Private actions, especially
in the antitrust, securities, and civil rights fields, have not only supplemented the limited
budgets of government enforcement agencies but have also contributed materially to the
development and refinement of the common law, not in the least by establishing prece-
dents in areas where the government has feared to tread. There are many reasons why
a government agency may not institute a meritorious lawsuit. These include subtle or
direct political influence, budgetary limitations, the policies and priorities of a particular
administration... and simple bureaucratic inertia, incompetence, or oversight. To vest
a government agency with a monopoly over the decision whether or not to prosecute
class action damage suits, or to move in that direction by placing obstacles in the path
of potential private litigants,. can only give wider range to the factors that inhibit full
and effective law enforcement by government agencies at the expense of the beneficial
corrective role of the private suit that has served our pluralistic system well." Id. at
45.
100. See text accompanying notes 72-81 supra.
liability suit for violation of a securities law must strive to achieve. 1 1
Deterrence is considered the most important because deterrence is the
very basis of civil liability suits for violation of a securities law.102 In
other words, civil liability was created to protect the public interest by
providing a deterrent sufficient to ensure that the defendant never
again contravened the securities law and consequently never again
harmed the public by lessening investor confidence in the securities
market. 10 3 Thus, the 25530(b) governmental class action, the private
class action, or the consolidated action must provide full deterrence by
requiring the violator to disgorge that sum of money gained by activity
made illegal by the securities law.
Deterrence by disgorgement does not, however, mean that the en-
tire fund disgorged will eventually make its way into the hands of the
individuals harmed by the violative activity;0 4 individual redress, 05
101. These criteria are identical to the criteria recently set forth for consumer class
actions. See Gould, supra note 98, at 13-48. Gould advocates deterrence as the prime
consideration for allowing the consumer class action, followed, in order of importance,
by individual redress and judicial economy. Id. The report also lists subordinate goals
for a consumer class action which are also appropriate in determining the overall ef-
ficacy of the governmental 25530(b) de facto class action, the private class action, and
consolidation of the actions. These subordinate goals are: (1) establishment of legal
precedent; (2) education of consumers (investors); (3) complete exposure of wrongdo-
ing; (4) mutual reinforcement with other areas of the law; (5) more detailed discovery;
(6) individually unprovable claims adjudicated; and (7) psychological benefits of adjudi-
cation. Id. at 48-53. In reality, there is little if any difference between an investor
and a consumer, and analysis of the problems of redressing mass wrongs in the consumer
field should be directly applicable to the problems of redressing mass wrongs in the secu-
rities context. "It is a sign of the times that the area of consumer protection is expand-
ing from those areas primarily directed at retail transactions to those areas directed to-
wards more sophisticated financial transactions. Consumer protection follows the con-
sumer into the areas in which he becomes involved. Unfortunately, the consumer some-
times moves faster than the law, but, hopefully, the law is not far behind." Siegel, Cur-
rent Efforts in Consumer Protection in the Business-Investment Area, 8 SAN DIEGO L.
Rav. 62, 74 (1971).
102. See L. Loss & E. CowmEr, BLUE, SKY LAw 129-31 (1958).
103. "Inadequate protection of the public interest because of financial burdens on
private plaintiffs is not a new problem or one unique to such external costs as air pollu-
tion. Both antitrust and securities laws provide areas in which the private litigant is
both supplanted by government action and supported in his own right because of the
public interest involved." Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21
STAN. L. Rnv. 383, 412 n.119 (1969). For an excellent discussion of the economic ef-
fect of such deterrence upon the defendant, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSTS OF LAW
357-60 (1972).
104. 'The cost-internalizing function [deterrence] of the class action as opposed
to the redistributive function of transferring wealth from the defendant to the plaintiffs
has ... been recognized." Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21
STAN. L. REv. 383, 415 (1969).
105. Individual redress is concerned with restitution or compensatory damages and
does not include punitive damages.
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second in importance of the three criteria under discussion, was designed
to serve this function. Individual redress is concerned with securing
for the injured individuals the maximum dollar award allowable in
order to assure investors' confidence in the fairness of the investment
system. Nonetheless, individual redress is a less important goal than
deterrence because redress to injured individuals is, in reality, only an
adjunct to the deterrent function.1 6
The third goal for a civil liability suit for violations of a security
law is judicial economy, 07 a criterion designed to ensure that litiga-
tion does not unduly burden scarce judicial resources.' Nonetheless,
the need for judicial economy is not a sufficient reason to preclude
necessary and meritorious litigation. Thus, the goal of judicial econ-
omy is proper to the extent that it can be applied after other stated
criteria are satisfied and must therefore rank as least important of the
three criteria. 0 9
The Three Alternatives Considered Vis-a-Vis
the Established Criteria
The objective of this concluding section is to discuss briefly the
alternatives of the 25530(b) governmental action, the private class ac-
tion, and consolidation of the two actions in relation to the criteria of
deterrence, individual redress, and judicial economy. The approach
taken throughout this note to the competition of remedies problem has
been to attempt to articulate those factors upon which a court faced
with competing government and private actions must determine the
appropriate course of action. A generalization stating the most
appropriate alternative under all circumstances has been avoided as it
is thought that changing circumstances may dictate differing solutions.
This final section will continue in this same manner, avoiding a gen-
eralization that states a single procedure, attempting instead to eluci-
date the changing factual circumstances that should determine whether
the 25530(b) governmental action, the private class action, or consoli-
dation will be optimally effective.
The deterrence factor has been stressed as the primary goal for
an action brought to secure relief for a violation of the state's securities
106. Cf. Gould, supra note 98, at 38 n.139.
107. Another rubric for what is intended by the use of this criterion is administra-
tive efficiency.
108. Judicial economy is to provide "economies of time, effort, and expense and
promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing proce-
dural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results." Advisory Committee's Note,
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 39 F.R.D. 73, 102-03 (1966).
109. Cf. Gould, supra note 98, at 36-38.
laws.110 The deterrent effect occurs when profit made by contraven-
tion of the securities law is taken away from the defendant. Thus, a
court choosing between the appropriate procedures available must
attempt to determine whether the 25530(b) governmental action, the
private class action, or the consolidated action will be most successful
in this regard. Many different factors will enter into this determina-
tion. For instance, there may be situations in which the private class
action would settle for less than the possible monetary award of a suc-
cessful judgment, while the governmental 25530(b) action would be
pursued to judgment. The reverse may also be true: there may be
situations in which the private class action would be pushed to judg-
ment while the governmental action would settle for a lesser monetary
award. Also affecting the court's determination should be the zealous-
ness and competence of counsel, both necessary factors in successful
judgment awards. These factors are, however, only a few of the issues
which must be examined, but they highlight well the process which the
court must use in determining which alternative will achieve optimal
deterrent effect.
The governmental 25530(b) action, the private class action, and
the consolidated action"1 may also differ in respect to the degree to
which each meets the criterion of individual redress. The action most
successful in this respect will be the action which leaves the largest per-
centage of the total judgment for distribution to the class. The
determinative factor here will be the method used by each procedure
to recover costs of the litigation. For example, it will generally be true
that costs of the litigation in the private class action will be covered
by apportioning some of the judgment fund to cover the costs, thereby
diminishing the individual amount of redress." 2  The 25530(b)
governmental action, on the other hand, may be able to escape the
assessment of costs against the judgment fund either by assessing costs
against the defendant or by allowing the state agencies involved to
110. See text accompanying notes 101-03 supra.
111. Consolidation is authorized in California under two separate provisions. One
statute authorizes consolidation of actions that are before the same court. CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. § 104 8(a) (West Supp. 1974). The second provision authorizes coordination
and consolidation of actions initially instituted in different courts. Id. §§ 404-04.8
(West 1973).
112. The argument could be made that the government action deprives the private
individuals of possible punitive damages and is therefore less effective in terms of indi-
vidual redress than the private class action pursuant to which a claim for punitive dam-
ages would be proper. Such an argument would misconstrue the meaning of the term
"individual redress." Individual redress is compensation for actual harm and not wind-
fall. The deterrent aspect of punitive damages in the private class action is equalized
somewhat in the governmental action by the possibility of criminal penalties. For the
provisions of these criminal penalties, see CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 25540-41 (West Supp.
1974).
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cover the costs. 113  The consolidated action would most likely offer a
sliding scale of degrees of individual redress as it will be an amalgam
of the cost recovery methods of the 25530(b) governmental class
action and the private class action.
In considering the three alternatives in terms of judicial economy,
the court will be seeking to ascertain which action will be the most man-
ageable and require the least judicial time. The private class action
and the governmental action would appear to fulfill this requirement
to almost the same degree as both are, in fact, class actions. But prob-
lems such as adequacy of representation, manageability, the proper
procedure for giving notice, and the determination of who shall bear
the cost of notice may arise in connection with one action while posing
no difficulties in the other. In terms of consolidation, there may be
situations in which the consolidation alternative so increases the com-
plexity of the case before the court as to render the consolidation of
the two actions untenable.
Conclusion
The problem of competing government and private actions both
striving to provide relief to private individuals for the same illegal con-
duct is inherent in the 25530(b) action. The possible competition be-
tween these two actions is the result of an attempt to guarantee that
public rights are vindicated and is, as such, a sign of the healthy deter-
rent forces at work under the enforcement provisions of the new
California Corporate Securities Law. Courts will need to ensure that
institution of either the governmental 25530(b) action or the private
class action is not discouraged by a priori judicial favoritism toward
either action. The appropriate course of action will be determined by
close scrutiny of those factors necessitating civil liability for a violation
of the securities law.
113. Exactly who must pay the costs in governmental representative proceedings is
an open question of law in California. Since the attorney general and commissioner
of corporations are performing a statutory duty in undertaking the litigation of a 25530
(b) claim it would seem reasonable to conclude that attorneys' fees, costs of notice, and
all other costs would be borne by the state. It could, however, be argued that since
the commissioner of corporations and attorney general are performing the duties of class
representative their agencies should be able to recover costs from the judgment fund just
as representatives in private class actions are allowed" to do. Procedure under another
governmental representation procedure is instructive. See New York Consumer Protec-
tion Law of 1969, NEw YoRK, N.Y., AmisThsA-V CoDE, ch. 64, tit. A, §§ 2203d-
1.0 to -8.0 (Supp. 1974). These provisions allow the government to bear all costs of
the action in the event of defeat. If the action is successful, the city's attorney work
is free to the class. Costs of the litigation are recoverable from the defendant, but if
not so recovered, the costs are assessed against the judgment fund. Id. §§ 2203d-04.0
(c); see The Government as Robin Hood, supra note 54, at 329-32.
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It is hoped that the new 25530(b) governmental action will be
used and that it will significantly deter future violations of the securities
law. Nevertheless, it is not the function of the 25530(b) action to re-
place the private class action in securities regulation litigation. The
end result of the interplay between the 25530(b) action and the
private class action should result in a bolstering of all remedies for vio-
lations of the securities law. This result, in its turn, will hopefully fur-
ther investor confidence and strengthen our investment system.
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